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This essay intervenes in the emerging discussions around animism by situating animism 
within the ongoing projects of colonial bio- and necropolitics. While ‘animism’ is often taken 
to denote pre- or anti- or counter-modern cosmologies that promise an alternative to the 
ontologies that sustain colonial violence, it has been recognised that there are in fact a variety 
of ways in which animism is ‘built in’ to modernity, and in which modernity itself is 
constituted as animistic. This essay pulls this recognition in a new direction by developing a 
theory of the ‘distribution of the animate’, describing a system of animist perception and 
expression by which different kinds of bodies, beings and forces are positioned and 
differentiated. This theory allows me to explore a shared zone in which the apparently 
relentless materialism of colonial biopolitics and the supposedly spiritual orientation of 
animism meet, collide and intertwine. This zone appears in this essay in a range of moments 
and modes, including the ‘word’ of possession in new world conquest, the anthropological 
invention of animism itself, the anticolonial resistance and spirit possession of the Hauka, the 
transubstantiative magic of chattelisation and, via an extended close reading, the text and 
performance of Marlene NourbeSe Philip’s long poem, Zong!. I show that animism is not 
really the other to colonial modernity: to say this is to buy into a foundational colonial myth. 
Instead, what is at stake in the theoretical construct of animism are the qualities that 
distinguish one kind of life from another. The colonial systems for knowing the other 
(enshrined in anthropology) and dominating the other (exemplified by biopolitics) invent, 
recruit and disavow animism in order to naturalise the denial of personhood to colonialism’s 
others. My ultimate argument is that for animism to escape these systems of possession it has 
to become something other than animism, by affirming a dispossession (rather than 
distribution) of animacy. I locate this dispossession in the sound and performance of Zong! 
and associate it with the poem’s refusal of more familiar literary projects that try to reclaim 















  2 
 
 
Dispossessing Animism: Zong! and Spiritual Baptism 
 
There is an extraordinary power in the possession of a language. 
— Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 
 
Words break into sound, return to their initial and originary phonic sound — grunts, plosives, 
labials — is this, perhaps, how language might have sounded at the beginning of time? 
— M. NourbeSe Philip, ‘Notanda’ to Zong! 
 
This essay attempts to situate animism within the terrain of colonial biopolitics. The aim is to 
tease out a relationship between the supposedly nonmodern practice of animism and the 
paradigmatically modern work of making live and letting die, or between the notionally 
precolonial cosmologies of the animists and the definitively colonial project of making die, of 
necropolitics.1 I want to give these apparently distinct and even incompatible terms a jolt, not 
to breathe new life into them but to expose their shared investments in the processes of 
making (a)live. 
If it is possible to speak of an animist turn in contemporary thought, one can further 
distinguish between ontological thinkers of animism, such as Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 
Eduardo Kohn and Tim Ingold, and epistemological thinkers, such as Nurit Bird-David and 
Graham Harvey. Whether animism is interpreted through ontology or epistemology, as a 
framework of being or as a way of knowing, it tends to constitute an alternative to the 
deficiencies of modern thought in its dominant and dominative forms. Bird-David, for 
example, pursues animism as a ‘relational epistemology’ that provides a corrective to the 
dualism of ‘modernist’ thought,2 while for Harvey animism incubates an ethics of 
environmental and interpersonal ‘respect’.3 For Ingold, animism names an ‘animic’ ontology 
rather than epistemology: it is not about belief in an ensouled world or the imputation of spirit 
to inert matter, because the animacy of the world is understood to be ‘ontologically prior’ to 
the differentiation between spirit and substance, agency and materiality. Animism here is 
about being in rather than holding beliefs about the world.4 Viveiros de Castro’s work on 
Amazonian perspectivism pursues an extravagant theoretical reversal, as he advocates the 
necessity of an ‘externalisation of reason’ rooted not in non- or pre- but in counter-modern 
thought: this is not about ‘classifying cosmologies’ but ‘counter-analyzing [our] 
anthropologies’.5 
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In contrast to these trends, I want to read animism as something that already inheres in 
modernity — and modernity as something that inheres in animism. This is not in itself an 
entirely original move: the supposed opposition between modernity and animism, or secular 
reason and myth or magic, has been challenged from a variety of perspectives.6 But my focus 
is different. If ontology is about how the world is, and epistemology about how the world is 
known, my interest is in how the world is produced, through power. In bringing animism into 
the orbit of the biopolitical, I therefore shift the focus from the prior animacy of things or the 
ways by which we might become attuned to their aliveness, to the sense in which animacy, or 
in more heavily freighted vocabulary ‘life’, is produced and managed by power. I explore the 
entanglement of colonial power with animism over the question of who and what is living 
and who or what is dead, of where to locate the bodies of this world within a differentiated 
universe of aliveness and a hierarchised system of personhood. Here I develop the concept of 
the ‘distribution of the animate’. This phrase indicates that animacy — encompassing full 
human personhood and the most minimally alive — is something that is not only described 
but also distributed, involving the assignation of particular ‘parts and positions’ within an 
animistic hierarchy to different beings, bodies and forces. 
If biopolitics implies the distinctly animistic labour of distributing personhood, aliveness or 
animacy, it also generates new bodies and locii for biopolitical capture. Biopolitics, ironically, 
is always extending its sense of what it means to be alive. It therefore seems unlikely that 
animism would promise a ready-made exit from the putatively de-animative dynamics of 
modernity. In contrast to the gesture of reclaiming animism from the abjection to which 
colonial anthropologists consigned it, or revitalising it in response to the predicament of the 
Anthropocene, I am interpreting animism less as a viable term for a non-modern ontological 
disposition than as a feature common to modern thought and its disavowed others, in the 
simple sense that these systems always imply a work of animation and de-animation. This 
involves some account of the divisions between and within the living and non-living and 
some system (cultural, political, ritual) for reproducing them. 
It is clear that animism as a theoretical construct is already bound up with colonial history, as 
can be seen in the colonial anthropology of figures such as Edward B Tylor. My further and 
more original claim is that colonialism is a kind of animism that operates in part through the 
very invention of animism as a concept, by which coloniality sought to establish its own 
rationalist supremacy. To summarise briefly: colonial anthropologists thought that animists 
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were mistaken because they attributed human qualities – personhood, thought, aliveness, 
agency – to nonhuman beings and forces. This ‘mistake’ informed the colonial decision to 
deny these purportedly human qualities to animists themselves. Animists fail to separate 
themselves from the mute, nonhuman world that it is the precise mission of colonialism to 
dominate. What is at stake in animism, re-read through colonial power, is not the affirmation 
of the potential liveliness of all things, but the profoundly political and biopolitical question 
of who and what gets attributed human qualities and who and what doesn’t. Coloniality 
functions as animism in asking and answering this question, even as it disavows this animism 
by presenting itself as Enlightenment – as something that sees the world as it is, rather than as 
something that creates and distributes its hierarchies and divisions. This political question is 
rarely if ever addressed by new animism and its cognates. Colonial reason, moreover, reread 
through animism, doesn’t secure a special place for human beings as endowed with a higher 
life but only the supremacy of a particular kind of human: the white man. 
Where does this leave animism ‘itself’, if it is possible to speak of such a thing? I am 
interested throughout this essay in how colonial animism may be resisted, subverted, short-
circuited, and escaped. And I am interested in how animist practices are put to work in this 
process. This means that, having degraded the opposition between modernity/coloniality and 
animism I will, in turn, suggest some ways in which animism can and does resist. I find one 
answer in Michael Taussig, who explores the anticolonial energy of animist practices that 
redeploy signifiers of colonial power and redistribute the hierarchies of animacy, at least in 
the space-time of performance. To dispossess animism, however – to reference my title – is to 
take a further step: to dispossess it of this animating and de-animative capacity. Or might it be 
that animism itself can somehow accomplish this dispossession? Can we think, as I hope to 
show, of an animism that would dispossess itself? 
The promise of animism as (bio)politicised performance resides, I suggest, in this 
dispossessive power. I develop my argument through a reading of Zong! (2008), the 
remarkable long poem by the Tobagonian-Canadian poet, M. NourbeSe Philip. The poem 
exposes the animistic underpinnings of coloniality; it estranges and unworks colonial 
animism, through a playfully animistic deployment of language; and it re-activates a non-
totalising and self-aware animism that is open to history and historical action, through a 
partial and strategic appropriation of the syncretic animism of Spiritual Baptist religious 
performance. What is crucial is that the poem ultimately seeks to free animacy from the 
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distributive power of system itself, as it undoes the differentiations and hierarchies of colonial 
animism and refuses more familiar literary projects of re-personalisation. Here I focus upon 
Philip’s insistence on sound as the material affirmation of an animacy from the void, from 
‘the beginning of time’. This animacy is heard beyond (or before) the biopolitical 
dispensations of modern personhood, and must be heard as the precondition for a newly 
emancipated or dispossessed voice. 
 
Distribution of the Animate 
It is usually assumed that the advent of colonial modernity heralded the extinction of 
animism. It is commonplace within postcolonial theory, for example, to position European 
colonialism as a force that overwrites or obliterates animist and other indigenous 
cosmologies, replacing them with a homogenising regime of countability, measurement, 
reduction, and extraction.7 Colonial anthropologists, interestingly, thought something similar, 
or rather invented the historical schema that shapes this perception: Edward B Tylor (one of 
the first to use the term ‘animism’ in a systematic way), or Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in the French 
imperial context, argued in their respective idioms that the rational ontology of European rule 
inevitably superseded ‘savage’ thought.8 These interpretations, however, tend to collapse the 
history of the violent destruction of animist ontologies into the elimination of animacy itself, 
as if the subjugation of colonised peoples also secured the supremacy of instrumental reason 
and its deanimated world. In this view, colonial modernity appears as a force for dis-
enchanting the world. As Adorno and Horkheimer put it, ‘the dis-enchantment of the world is 
the extirpation of animism’ (my emphasis).9 
My first step is to suggest something different. Rather than pitting Enlightenment and 
animism against one another in a dialectical struggle, I want to reformulate the relationship 
between coloniality and animism through the concept of the ‘distribution of the animate’. I 
am adapting this phrase from Jacques Rancière’s familiar idea of the ‘distribution of the 
sensible’, which refers to the sociopolitical rules that determine what can be ‘apprehended by 
the senses’. The distribution of the sensible implies a system of sense perception, involving 
procedures of inclusion and exclusion that separate the visible from the invisible, the audible 
from the inaudible, regulating what can be ‘said, thought, made, or done’.10 The distribution 
of the animate, by analogy, is then a system of animist perception and expression, within 
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which different kinds of bodies, beings and forces are positioned. These ‘parts and positions’ 
are not passively given: the system reproduces them even if they are assumed to be self-
evident. This is not a belief system but a much larger machine with a more extensive 
contextual scaffolding, involving such things as technology, ritual, language, social life, and 
political power. 
 
The anthropological invention of animism involved separating the distanced European 
outlook of the detached observer, emerging out of the division between object and subject 
and the supposed sovereignty of reason, from an animistic belief in an ensouled world, in 
widely distributed personhood, and in the immediative powers of ritual and language.11 One 
might sharpen the distinctions here: animism is about interaction with a living world; 
modernity names the domination of a deanimated nature. Or: animism is mistaken; modern 
science captures objective reality. But one might also try to blunt them: aren’t we 
distinguishing one version of how animacy is distributed in the world from another, rather 
than separating an animated world from a de-animated one?  
 
Bruno Latour declares that we have never been modern. For him, it is less puzzling in our 
epoch that ‘people still believe in animism’ than that others believe naively in a ‘deanimated 
world of mere stuff’, given the terrifying intensification of non-human agencies in the 
Anthropocene.12 But this effort to unseat the modernity/animism opposition needs to follow 
different lines. After all, animist cosmologies do not assert that everything is equally alive, 
nor that the world is defined by the intensification or proliferation of agencies. As Irving 
Hallowell’s celebrated work on Ojibwe thought demonstrates, to imagine a many-personed 
world is not to assume the ‘human-likeness’ or ‘life-likeness’ of inanimate things. The 
category of personhood is internally differentiated, so that there may be human persons, rock 
persons, bear persons, and so on.13 Moreover, the work of de-animation can certainly play a 
role within animist thought. Viveiros de Castro makes this clear in his work on the 
metaphysics of predation. Perspectivism ‘is only rarely applied to all animals’ (even though it 
includes the dead). It most frequently involves large predators and scavengers (jaguars, 
anacondas, vultures) and the typical prey of humans (wild boar, monkeys, fish). Nevertheless, 
most if not all things that exist are defined by their ‘relative position on a scale of predatory 
power’.14 Amazonian perspectivism is, among many other things, a thought of 
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differentiations and hierarchies, subjectivisations and de-animations. 
To step back to the general, animism essentially names one system for distributing animacy 
(whether this is considered to mean personhood or just aliveness), which is taken to be 
different from modernity’s (de)animative systems. This is where new materialism and 
animism, as related counterpoints to modern regimes of thought, sharply diverge: while new 
materialism, including the work of Latour and others such as Jane Bennett, seeks to amplify 
the agency of nonhuman things, where this agency is imagined in the least restrictive terms 
possible, animism asserts the existence of various forms of nonhuman personhood or 
minimally personed aliveness, systematically articulated within a total vision of being. New 
materialism has no interest in personhood: it is on the contrary invested in uncovering forms 
of agency and animation immanent to matter, without reference to supposedly 
anthropocentric ideas of agent, subject and person.15 These forms of agency emerge through 
a heightened perceptual sensitivity which suspends habitual ideas about what is alive and 
what is dead. It is not about a new distribution of the animate, in other words, since it by 
definition refuses to re-assign ‘parts and positions’; it is more a happy corrective to modern 
perceptual biases — and one with uncertain political implications.16 
 
Animist Coloniality 
If new materialism advocates a loosely animist ethos in the service of the post-humanist 
renewal of modern thought, then it needs to be recognised that modernity is already an 
articulation (or reterritorialization) of animism as a distributive system. This is most obvious 
in the case of biopolitics, since biopolitics literally takes ‘life itself’ as its object of control. 
But the case of animism and colonial modernity makes this recognition more complicated, 
since animism is originally an invention of colonial discourse. The animism of coloniality is 
therefore bound up with the dynamics of disavowal. Colonial modernity has disavowed the 
animism that is in fact proper to it. 
I do not interpret this disavowed animism as a residual expression of the vibrancy of matter, 
but as linked to the appropriation of the power to distribute the animate, to animate and to de-
animate the bodies of this world. This is to approach the exertion of a power over the spheres 
of the living and the dead. What is striking is that this power was exercised in a particularly 
violent way at the scene of animism’s anthropological invention: in the colonial encounter. It 
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is as if, in order to move beyond animism into the world of (eventually) secular and scientific 
rationality, modernity needed to recruit, retain or intensify animism as a power over life or 
death, while disavowing this move through the violent othering of animism and animists. 
This is connected to the history of the possession of colonised lands and bodies. Colonial or 
biopolitical animism is an animism that expresses a material and spiritual dispossession. 
I am here echoing Laurent Dubreuil’s effort to ‘[situate] the colony in relation to possession’ 
in his book Empire of Language. Dubreuil’s reading of French imperialism revolves around 
what he calls the ‘word’ of possession. The original word for colony in French was 
possession, and for this reason there is a sense in which the performative power of the 
colonial speech-act — by which territory was legally appropriated — also ‘communicates 
with’ indigenous spirit possession.17 In essence, Dubreuil claims that the language of a figure 
like Champlain is defined by a special kind of speech act that borrows the animistic power 
that it simultaneously disavows. Champlain ‘speaks to change reality’; what is interesting is 
that this mode of transformative speech appropriates a spiritual power associated with newly 
dispossessed indigenous people. Champlain appropriates indigenous peoples’ lands and the 
powers of possession that reside (according to colonial anthropologists) in their spiritual 
practices. 
Dubreuil’s reading seems something of a provocation. Does the fact that Champlain uses the 
word ‘possession’ necessarily invoke indigenous spirit possession? Is this confusion or 
semantic co-implication really there in Champlain’s words (and in the words of many others 
that Dubreuil quotes), or is this merely an effect of Dubreuil’s reading? The fundamental 
insight, that colonial speech involves a certain phrase of possession that is far from merely 
legal or rational, seems intuitively right. It plainly follows that Champlain speaks to change 
reality. But what theory of language, or of the speech act, is at play in this claim? While 
Dubreuil remains elusive on these matters, we might venture that his whole argument implies 
an animistic operation of language. Christopher Bracken, in a book that similarly moves 
between colonial and postcolonial archives, explains how animism was distinguished from 
modern or civilised thought by its obedience to what Lévy-Bruhl called the ‘law of 
participation’, as opposed to the ‘law of contradiction’.18 The law of participation implies a 
particular conception of what discourse or language is and does: rather than describing the 
world, it participates in it; rather than representing or mediating things, it is about 
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actualisation, ‘immediation’. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth-century colonial 
and anthropological archive (and earlier, if Dubreuil is to be believed), one encounters the 
constant unhinging of the distinction between ‘mimesis, a discourse that imitates, and poiesis, 
a discourse that invents’.19 We find what Agamben would call an ‘intimate caesura’, 
constantly retraced, between a language that steps back from the world in order to represent it 
as an object, and a language that immediates, enacts, invents the world.20 But the intimacy of 
this caesura rests upon the fact that it cuts within modern thought, so that the separation 
between the two sides is unstable. Discourse, in this animistic mode, becomes something 
else: it is ‘not an instrument for the communication of thought but an occasion for the 
deployment of forces’.21 
How does this distinction between a language of participation and contradiction relate to 
animism understood as a distributive system? To distribute animacy is to enact a power, a 
force; it is to perform an involvement in the world, rather than to describe a world whose 
parts and positions are determined in advance.22 Modern thought claims a certain detachment 
from the world; it reserves no space for magic or for the shamanistic because its purpose is 
not to transform or intervene but only to represent.23 This anthropological self-description, 
though, is clearly faulty: the entire domain of modern biopolitics is devoted precisely to 
intervention in the domain of the living, indeed to the invention of new bodies and horizons 
of aliveness to be encompassed by sovereign control. Furthermore, if disenchantment is the 
extirpation of animism, the very force of that ‘is’ implies an animistic or magical operation of 
language, one that licenses in turn the bloody magic by which people are turned into things. I 
will return to this point in my close reading of the estrangement of the copula in Philip’s 
Zong! below, but for now I need to recognise that animism, in turn, may confront this 
colonial distribution of animacy through a minoritarian incursion that dispels or reworks it. 
Both animistic modes are about power, but the former is about a dominative potestas and the 
latter a potentially historically liberating potentia. 
The so-called ‘new animism’ risks offering a simple cultural correlative to the project of new 
materialism: Graham Harvey’s advocacy of ‘respect for the living world’ implies an ethical 
posture that recognises our shared investment in a horizontal network of relations that 
enmeshes different kinds of bodies. These forms of respect are to be found in a variety of 
cultural and subcultural locations that offer coherent alternatives to the dominative modes of 
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knowing and being. But the conception of animism I am pursuing, evident in the work of 
Dubreuil and Bracken, is all about relations of power. This is evident, first of all, in the status 
of animism as an operative signifier within the colonial division of the world, bound to the 
violence of modernity’s conceptual and material autoconstitution. The very concept of 
animism was created within a racialised process of onto-epistemological division, in which 
the insistence upon one kind of difference encoded a further series of hierarchical and 
historically durable oppositions. In essence, animism belonged to an obsolete past whose 
residual traces were savage peoples, and it was the project of colonial power to bind these 
peoples to its own temporality: to colonise them.24 But, as Michael Taussig shows in Mimesis 
and Alterity, animism may be about power in another sense, insofar as it deploys a potentially 
insurrectionary agency via its shamanistic and mimetic devices. 
One of Taussig’s examples is the Hauka movement, whose members were imprisoned by the 
French in Niger and the British in Ghana in the 1920s and 30s. The Hauka had amassed 
significant political power, establishing their own settlements and networks of anticolonial 
influence. They were openly dissident, threatening the legitimacy of the colonial order. The 
movement began among the Songhay people, who would dance, dress up and mimic colonial 
officials, becoming possessed by their spirits. In these states of possession they would acquire 
strange powers and exhibit disturbing bodily effects: ‘frothing at the mouth, bulging of the 
eyes, contorted limb movements, inability to feel pain’.25 The Songhay would mimic specific 
white men, who would then enter the Hauka pantheon, such as Korsasi, the wicked major, 
who was the spirit of a French commandant who brutally assaulted early members of the 
movement, or King Zuzi, the colonial chief justice.26 Taussig links the Hauka to the ‘African 
white man’ photographed by Herbert Cole in an Igbo Mbari shrine house in 1967. He 
speculates that the coloniser might greet this representation with a self-congratulatory 
response: ‘They think we are gods’. But he argues that there is something excessive about 
this sculpture that ought to trouble this complacency: ‘After all, who knows — in imaging us 
as gods, might they not take our power?’27 This imagines a reversal of the process of 
‘possession’ described by Dubreuil: here, it is anticolonial mimesis — the Hauka or Igbo 
‘possession’ of the form of the coloniser — that threatens the European ‘possession’ of 
African lands. It does so in a material way: Hauka spirit possession is partially interpretable 
as a pragmatic tactics of resistance, disseminating a spirit of revolt among colonised peoples. 
But the special space-time of performance seems to exceed this function as well, as if it 
  11 
 
 
enacts an immanent redistribution of the parts and positions of the colonised world. 
The most famous, if brief, account of the relationship between rites of spirit possession and 
anticolonial resistance is to be found in Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon 
writes of rituals of possession and dance and argues that these express an ‘overexcited 
affectivity’, an ‘erotic delight in the muscular deflation of the crisis’. In other words, they 
express but misdirect a revolutionary energy; in fact, ‘vampirism, possession by djinns, by 
zombies, and by Legba, the illustrious god of voodoo’ paradoxically ensure the ‘stability of 
the colonised world’. What has to happen is for the ‘colonised subject [to] discover reality’ 
and transform it through revolutionary praxis.28 The colonised must and will move away 
from the libidinal expenditure of pent-up energy in collective rituals of possession to the 
material harnessing of this energy in the light of a materialist grasp of colonial domination – 
of what reality actually is. To put a spin on this, one could say that dance and possession are 
tactics for living, techniques for psychic survival under insupportable conditions, but as such 
need to be left behind through the recognition of the actual insurvivability of colonial 
domination. The problem, here, is that in this Fanonian schema these are basically primordial 
rituals that are resurrected in the colonial world because of the muscular energies they allow 
to be expressed and released; while there is the potential for a dialectical historicisation of 
these practices (as in the famous analysis of Négritude in Black Skin, White Masks), there is 
no real sense of them relating actively to a praxis of resistance, nor any account of the 
repurposing of the forms and iconographies of them in response to colonial domination. They 
are in essence expressions of false consciousness, where the colonised falsely imagine a 
possession by spirits rather than apprehending their real possession by colonialism. 
What the Hauka suggest, by contrast, are the historical specificity of these rituals, and their 
power as tools for discovering and reshaping reality on a number of levels. What is witnessed 
is a performative reversal of colonial power, a seizure of the guise and potentially the 
perspective, in properly shamanistic manner, of colonial authority. This is certainly 
subversive: it throws the system into a kind of play, where the various parts and positions are 
suddenly up for grabs. It de-activates coloniality as a hierarchy of beings, and is a direct 
expression of animism as a counter-distribution of the animate, in which the colonial 
organisation of the living and the ‘more dead than alive’ is reworked.29 But Taussig’s 
extravagant reading of the destabilising effects of what he calls ‘second contact’, as the 
colonial gaze meets itself represented by the other, implies something more disturbing than a 
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mere symbolic rearrangement or counter-distribution of power: ‘“us” and “them” lose their 
polarity and swim in and out of focus’; a ‘dissolution’ takes place, as ‘stable identity 
formations auto-destruct into silence, gasps of unaccountable pleasure, or cartwheeling 
confusion’.30 In the moment of second contact the entire project of anthropology as a ‘border 
logistics’ of self and other is thrown into question; self and other instead seem to interfuse via 
a mutual dispossession. So while, for the Hauka (and pace Fanon), spirit possession is 
expressive of an anticolonial spiritual and material resistance, for Taussig it enacts in the 
mode of ‘second contact’ the deconstruction of the anthropological project. Crucially for my 
argument, this project is understood as the foundation of the very edifice of colonial animism, 
of us and them, of persons and less-than-persons and things. Could one therefore speak of 
spirit possession as the expression of a dispossessing animism, since it dissolves the parts and 
positions of the colonial order? These anticolonial rituals of possession, in stark contrast to 
the work of colonial dispossession, seem to generate in the space-time of performance a 
shared dispossession, or even a kind of possessionlessness. 
Animism, here, interrupts animism; it exposes a certain inoperativity. If animism is born out 
of the colonial encounter, and seizes its politicised vocation as a resistance to the status of the 
object, might it also open onto a further situation, in which the power to objectify or 
subjectify is ceaselessly deferred and undone? When I speak of animism’s dispossession, it is 
something like this that I mean to gesture towards. 
 
Zong! 
M. NourbeSe Philip’s Zong! is an innovative and perhaps completely new kind of poem, 
which announces an absolute break from post-romantic languages of lyrical expressivity. 
Zong! is an animist poem, I suggest, in the sense that it imagines language as a vehicle for the 
release or ‘deployment’ of forces. It appropriates and also unworks the power of possession, 
and in doing so confronts and deranges the animist and biopolitical hierarchies of the 
colonial. The poem does not merely rearrange the parts and positions: it instead interrupts the 
‘distribution of the animate’, unmooring words, sounds and sense from the distributive power 
of system — including the system of language. It is as if the whole system that would arrange 
and partition animation and personhood is implicated in colonial violence, such that the task 
becomes to find a way out of any closed or totalising representation. 
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Zong! is not concerned with the seizure of colonial lands but with the enslavement of bodies 
and the system of de-animation that supports it. The workings of this system are crystallised 
in the notorious case that gives the poem its title: the case of the Zong massacre. The Zong 
was a slave ship from which, on a voyage from the Cape Coast to Jamaica, one hundred and 
thirty three enslaved Africans were thrown overboard. The events began on 29 November 
1781, when Luke Collingwood, the captain of the Zong, which was approaching the end of its 
voyage, ordered that fifty four enslaved women and children be thrown overboard; over the 
next four days, a further seventy nine slaves were thrown to their deaths. Collingwood 
believed that if the slaves were ‘jettisoned’, their loss would be the responsibility of the ship’s 
insurers, whereas if they died a ‘natural death’ — a phrase Philip is sceptical about (what 
would a natural death be in this context?) — the slavers would bear the cost. The motivation 
for Collingwood’s actions purportedly related to the scarcity of water following navigational 
errors, but this claim has been disputed.31 The insurers refused to pay, leading to a legal case 
(Gregson vs Gilbert), heard by Lord Mansfield, through which the Gregson slave-syndicate 
sought to recover its losses. The verdict in this case was set aside, though Lord Mansfield 
pronounced that he ‘had no doubt (though it shocks one very much) that the case of the slaves 
was the same as if horses had been thrown overboard’.32 
It is difficult to think of a more succinct expression of the logic of chattelisation than Zong, 
and the Zong massacre became a centrepiece of abolitionist arguments for decades. In 
response to interventions from the abolitionist Granville Sharp in the Gregson vs Gilbert 
case, the solicitor-general, John Lee, turned towards the public gallery: 
What is all this vast declaration of human beings thrown overboard? The question 
after all is, was it voluntary, or an act of necessity? This is a case of chattels or goods. 
It is really so: it is the case of throwing over goods; for to this purpose, and the 
purpose of the insurance, they are goods and property: creatures if you will — have 
been thrown overboard: whether or not for the preservation of the rest, that is the real 
question.33 
These slaves were not human beings but goods, chattel, moveable property. This plainly 
expresses a logic of dehumanisation. But what is more disturbing is that the human, in this 
context, is in fact perfectly compatible with the deanimated status of a thing. Slaves are 
socially dead but this does not imply that slaveowners and slave traders thought that they 
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were not human.34 And in fact, the solicitor-general’s words reinforce this sense: this ‘vast 
declaration’ of human beings is not so much contradicted by the facts of ‘the purpose’ as it is 
voided of significance: it belongs to a completely different sphere of (abolitionist) 
signification. 
How does a human being become a slave? Through law but also through magic, or through 
the law as magic. Here, we are reprising the doubleness of dis-possession. In her ‘Notanda’ to 
Zong!, Philip suggests that in the law’s 
ability to decree what is not, as in a human being ceasing to be and becoming an 
object, a thing or chattel, [it] approaches the realm of magic and religion. The 
conversion of human into chattel becomes an act of transubstantiation the equal of the 
metamorphosis of the eucharistic bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ.35 
Notwithstanding the magical force of this transubstantiation, slaves are not expelled from the 
domain of the living. Instead, Philip writes, they are ‘in life but without life’ (196). The 
enslaved were also not entirely expelled from the domain of personhood (a slave is 
recognised to be more ‘alive’ than a stone), but were instead trapped within the category of 
the legal slave, a radically degraded form of personhood.36 To be ‘in life but without life’ is 
to inhabit the world of the living but to be dispossessed of the rights that accrue to full legal 
persons — including the right to life, to live a life. The doubleness of this ‘life’ implies 
something more than the simple fact that the slaves were killed with impunity (robbed of the 
‘right to life’) and bespeaks the included exclusion characteristic of the biopolitical 
dispensation.37 For Philip to link this dispensation with magic is for her to invoke the 
animistic core of colonial biopolitics. 
Zong! uses the report of the Gregson vs Gilbert legal decision as its exclusive source text. As 
Philip explains: ‘I would lock myself in this text in the same way men, women, and children 
were locked in the holds of the slave ship Zong’ (191). Out of this narrow legal document, 
according to whose dominant protocols the slaves are only considered as property, Philip 
creates a new text by jumbling phrases, cutting sentences into fragments, iterating words and 
even breaking them apart. She describes this process as an act of retaliatory violence: 
I white out and black out words...I mutilate the text...I murder the text, literally cut it 
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into pieces, castrating verbs, suffocating adjectives, murdering nouns, throwing 
articles, prepositions, conjunctions overboard, jettisoning adverbs...[I] create semantic 
mayhem, until my hands are bloodied, from so much killing and cutting. (193) 
As the poem unfolds the formal violence becomes ever more extreme. While the first section 
is composed of a sequence of twenty-six numbered poems, recognisable as coherent texts, the 
later sections become ever more chaotic, until the words themselves are ripped apart:
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The fragmentation becomes yet more acute, until the poem is scarcely readable:
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It is as if Philip is tearing apart the cage of the language of enslavement, but to leave us with 
what (beyond the mayhem, the poet’s bloodied hands)?  
Zong! is a potent example of a text that exists ‘in the wake’, to invoke the title of Christina 
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Sharpe’s book about the ontology of slavery’s afterlife.38 It refuses almost any gesture of 
recuperation or rehumanisation of the victims of the event it ‘commemorates’ (the wrong 
word in this context), with the possible exception of the inclusion of a number of Yoruba 
names that run across the bottom of some of the pages. But even these names seem to be 
debarred from entering the text, from turning the language into the vehicle of a subject or 
story, of a voice. In a sense the poem extends and even intensifies the depersonalisation of 
enslavement, as whatever traces exist in the archive dissolve into shape and sound. Why 
might this be? How might this refusal of repersonalisation reflect the wider politics of this 
poem’s interrupted animism? 
In Spectres of the Atlantic, his brilliant study of the relationship between slavery and the 
history of finance, Ian Baucom uses the case of the Zong massacre to expose the brutal 
underpinnings of the imaginary of insurance. For Baucom, the murder of the slaves was 
neither a limit case nor an exception but typical, indeed systematically predictable within the 
epistemological codes that dominate our financialised age. These codes reduced the slaves’ 
bodies, in advance of their murder, to interest-bearing commodities. But Baucom 
counterpoints this dehumanising logic with an alternative ethos that would grasp the 
singularity rather than typicality of the event, and of each death/life it signifies. He explains: 
The value of the Zong to an ethics of historical memory depends on its being 
remembered as an abstractly typical rather than a singular atrocity. […But] this form 
of remembrance models its theory of value on the evaluative protocols of that 
insurance business which underwrote the value of these slaves to their ‘owners’ and 
demanded that that value would survive their deaths.39 
Thus, the number we need to come to terms with is not 133 (the number of slaves thrown 
overboard) but one: ‘One, one, one’.40 
While Baucom advocates a thought of the singular, however, he risks collapsing the singular 
into the very different concept of the person: the enslaved were ‘entirely singular human 
beings thrown one by one into the sea’.41 And yet one might respond by saying that this is 
precisely what these slaves were not, that in contrast they ‘had the shape of human beings but 
had no human essence whatever’.42 Singularity, here, seems indistinguishable from what 
might more loosely be called individuality or human uniqueness: the individual human 
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person, thought once, and then, impossibly, one hundred and thirty three times. Baucom thus 
advocates a different form of counter-imagining, rooted in ‘sympathy and sentiment’, than 
that which we see in Philip’s poem.43 But the singular, including in the kind of thought from 
which Baucom draws, such as deconstruction, tends to be a word for what appears in the 
displacement of historical personhood, of coherent, socialised subjectivity.44 The singular 
implies a different mode of relationality to formal civic or political recognition, with all of its 
violences and exclusions. These are the exclusions that Sylvia Wynter, in the black radical 
tradition, describes as man’s ‘overrepresentation’ of himself as the human itself.45 A 
particular model of propertied, racialised and gendered personhood becomes the definition of 
a politically qualified life. 
It therefore seems that the project of retrieving personhood from this scenario of radical 
depersonalisation would not be an untroubled one — even though such a project has a long 
and important history, most notably in the history of slave narratives. Slave autobiography (a 
word that began to emerge in the late eighteenth century, when slave narratives grew in 
number and prominence) was significant for its crucial role in advancing the cause of 
abolition, and also for its related assertion of the personhood of the enslaved subject (one 
might say, to echo recent historiographical arguments, that slave autobiography turns the 
slave into the enslaved subject). Many slave narratives, such as Olaudah Equiano’s or 
Frederick Douglass’s, are in essence narratives of conversion. Equiano’s, for example, is a 
narrative of Christian conversion, political conversion (as Equiano becomes an abolitionist) 
and above all socio-legal conversion: Equiano becomes a free man, having purchased his 
manumission for forty pounds sterling (a fact repeated a number of times in his narrative).46 
He publishes his narrative as a propertied man of wealth and status and this undergirds the 
authority of his account. Brenna Bhandar argues that the modern character of race emerged 
with ideas of property and associated logics of calculation. She calls these ‘economic visions 
of land and life rooted in logics of abstraction’, which are linked to the racial capacity to 
appropriate.47 While Equiano is at pains to emphasise that he has achieved this racialised 
capacity, most slave narratives offer glimpses of otherwise anonymous lives. The History of 
Mary Prince, for example — related but not, as in Equiano’s case, written by herself — is 
surrounded by the silence of the archive. All we have is the text itself, dictated to Susannah 
Strickland, edited and adapted by Thomas Pringle, and published in the same volume as an 
additional narrative of Louis Asa-Asa. There is no record of whether Prince was ever 
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formally manumitted, or of where or when she died.48 The exemplarity of an Olaudah 
Equiano or a Frederick Douglass is counterbalanced by the typicality of a Mary Prince, a 
Louis Asa-Asa. 
The enslaved of Zong were radically anonymous: the archive bears no traces of their names. 
Or perhaps it would be better to say that they are caught between radical anonymity and the 
unceasing iteration of the event of their death, even if the complete circumstances of this 
event will remain obscure. The one hundred and thirty three of Zong (or perhaps one hundred 
and thirty two — it is possible that one of the jettisoned might have climbed back on board 
the ship) thus seem a powerful if paradoxical example of what Arthur Bradley calls 
‘unbearable life’, naming lives that have not been lived or that rather have been erased from 
the record of those who lived or died. Indeed, Patterson’s reading of the social death of the 
slave is a precise expression of this predicament: the slave can never be brought to life again 
as such since ‘the slave will forever remain an unborn being (non-né)’.49 Rather than trying 
to reimagine or repersonalise such life without life, might the task be, as Bradley suggests, to 
think of it as a new kind of subject position from which to speak or act, or as a new 
ground(lessness) for biopolitical resistance?50 
Zong! for its part is incapable of reimagining the lives of these slaves outside of the terms 
bequeathed by the archive. In extending slavery’s logic of depersonalisation, Zong!’s 
response is more akin to that of J. M. W. Turner, in his 1840 painting ‘Slavers Throwing 
Overboard the Dead and the Dying’, which was inspired by the same event. There seem to be 
visual echoes of Turner in some of the pages of Philip’s poem, as if the broken words evoke 
the dispersed fragments of the bodies of the enslaved.51 Turner’s painting must here be 
understood less as the disavowal of the enslaved bodies it represents so incompletely than as 
a devastating expression of the breakdown of systematic constructions of space and time as 
they attempt to frame the horrors of colonial modernity. As Hito Steyerl puts it: 
The observer is upset, displaced, beside himself at the sight of the slaves, who are not 
only sinking but have also had their bodies reduced to fragments—their limbs 
devoured by sharks, mere shapes below the water surface. At the sight of the effects 
of colonialism and slavery, linear perspective—the central viewpoint, the position of 
mastery, control, and subjecthood—is abandoned and starts tumbling and tilting.52 
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This is also to say that in Turner, a new and transgressive animacy — the animacy of the 
sublime in painting — obliterates the calculative coldness of the imaginary of insurance, even 
if the painting loses the stability of linear visual perspective in the process. Does anything 
similar happen in Zong!? If the materiality of paint in Turner emerges out of the ruin of the 
perspectivised image, could we suggest, in precise analogy, that sound in Philip emerges out 
of the ruins of linguistic systematicity, of lyrical voice? 
 
Language and Sound 
Philip has recently offered the following visceral description of her experience working as a 
poet in English: 
I have spent my life as a poet and writer exploring what language means for someone 
like myself, condemned to work in a language that commits a rape in my mouth every 
time I speak. […] English is not my mother tongue. It is my father tongue and one 
which meant me and my mother no good.53 
Whereas Caribbean poets of an earlier generation such as Derek Walcott rewrote the toxic 
language of empire as inheritance and as gift,54 Philip feels ‘plagued’ by having to work with 
a language ‘contaminated by its history of empire and colonialism’.55 This hostility to 
language finds an intense expression in Zong!. But in Zong! this hostility is specifically 
linked to language understood as a tool of law-as-magic, as the vehicle of a violent 
‘transubstantiation’. This transubstantiative agency, at once magical and material, operates of 
course through a relentlessly rationalistic idiom, calculative and legalistic. The poem mimics 
this idiom, but in doing so imbues it with the strange incantatory power that it would 
disavow: 




This rigid language of analytical sense seems to have become a magical recitation, a kind of 
spell. Is this language not animistic, not dedicated to the deployment of forces? These lines 
mimic the copulative force of the law, its immediative and transubstantiative power (as in the 
Eucharistic ‘This is my body’), but what they also do is introduce a strangeness and 
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It is as if, at the risk of overdetermining the text, this spell leads to the production of ‘negroes 
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… was’, in the past tense, but it is equally that this shift in tense introduces historical memory 
into this immediative spell, such that it pauses in irresolution, hesitates – in contrast to the 
mock finality of the final line on p. 41. 
This section is typical of the larger text, in the sense that it captures a dilemma between non-
sense, or what Philip calls ‘pure utterance’, and some alternative regime of critical sense, if 
an elusive one: Philip describes fighting the desire to impose meaning on these words (194). 
There is a certain difficulty or effortfulness, captured by the interruption of rhythm and the 
spacing of the words (these poems are visual as much as textual artefacts) to the effort to shift 
the object of consideration, to recover those who have been imaginatively jettisoned. A 
similar effect occurs in Zong! #14:
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The penultimate line seems to interrupt this litany of ‘truth’, to disturb the banal simplicity of 
the account, of accounting. What emerges here is at once a biting satire, a derangement or 
bemaddening of the constricted sense of the law of slavery and insurance, and an effort to 
resist the spell and the sentence of history. 
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Zong!’s hostility is also directed towards the language and form of lyric poetry. Post-romantic 
lyricism defines most of our senses of what poetry simply is: a language to capture the 
thoughts, feelings or impressions of a speaker in place and time, with the ‘tacit assumption’ 
that it is a ‘univocal and authentic form of self-expression’.56 Sarah Dowling argues that 
Zong!, by employing lyric modes such as apostrophe, seeks to ‘reanimate the lost slaves’ and 
to ‘endow them with some degree of lyric if not legal personhood by giving them names’.57 
Dowling builds her interpretation out of Barbara Johnson’s reading of how lyric encodes a 
relationship between the first-person ‘I’ of the poem and the legal or constitutional person of 
the law.58 Lyric and the law are both rooted in a familiar idea of coherent and agential 
personhood; the implication is that Zong! works against the law’s work of de-personalisation 
in this context. My argument is more sympathetic with Alexandra Schultheis Moore’s: for 
Moore, Philip’s conjurings are less about borrowings from lyric poetry (which indeed seem 
scant) than about ‘manifest[ing] the radical dispossession of the subject’ in a condition of 
‘non-being’.59 
Lyricism is about the univocal, the single voice, which generates the effect or illusion of the 
coherent person. Zong! is more productively considered as a ruined lyric, which does as much 
premeditated violence to the language of poetry as to the language of the law. What happens 
to language in the performance of the poem? What appears in the wake of poetry’s murder? 
This is where the phenomenon of sound begins to emerge. Sound, in Philip, may be 
considered the alternative to voice, even as its negation. 
In his book In the Break, Fred Moten articulates a relationship between objecthood and 
sound. He departs from various sources: Édouard Glissant, in his declaration in Caribbean 
Discourse that ‘din is discourse’, that the word for the slave is ‘camouflaged’ under the 
‘provocative intensity of the scream’; Frederick Douglass, with his description of the ‘wild 
notes’ and ‘ineffable sadness’ of the slave songs that are a truer witness to the horror of 
enslavement than Aunt Hester’s shrieks; Karl Marx, whose speculation about the commodity 
who speaks is crossed over by the human commodity who really speaks or screams. Moten 
distinguishes his argument from the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure, who claimed that sound 
is ‘merely something ancillary, a material the language uses’: ‘Linguistic signals are not in 
essence phonetic. They are not physical in any way. They are constituted solely by 
differences which distinguish one such sound pattern from another’.60 Language for Saussure 
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is dead sound, but for Moten it is in the phonetic, in the ‘phonic materiality’ of sound, that 
something like subjectivity — even if completely disaggregated from personhood — may 
make itself felt. This ‘phonic materiality’ is connected to a ‘dispossessive force’, which 
testifies to the fact that in the ‘history of blackness …. objects can and do resist’.61 
Moten’s reading of the ‘dispossessive force’ of the phonic comes very close to an animist 
conception of language. In the structuralist view, at least as Moten presents it, language is an 
essentially non-phonetic system which happens to use sound as a mere material. But in 
animism, language is about immediation, and sound thus acquires a potentially irreducible, 
indeed a magical power. Here we are some distance from a representationalist account of 
language or of literature, which implies a distanced and unidirectional referentiality — a kind 
of ‘possession’ of the object, in which the represented is debarred from entering into or 
interanimating the language that summons it. Sound in contrast is the locus of some occult 
sympathy, which ‘expresses’, if one may use a word with such lyrical underpinnings, a 
subjectivity or witness outside of the bounds of personhood. One may think of sound, more 
precisely, as the expression of a singularity that withdraws from or dispossesses the construct 
of Man.62 
Philip’s poetry reaches for the sound within or in the wake of language. If language captures 
sound within a system of signification, it is sound that persists as the residue of language in 
the event of its breakdown, its corruption. Consider the opening to the very first poem of 
Zong!:
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Visually, words devolve into their component letters; it is as if they are submerged, and as if 
sense is drowning with them. In composing the poem, Philip imagined that her project was 
akin to exhuming bodies, only to discover that there is no word to describe ‘exhuming’ those 
who are drowned at sea (201). There are after all no graves; there is no location to mark 
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subaquatic death. Is it for us to ‘exhume’ sense from these dispersed fragments? The key 
word here is water; followed by good; and then (further down the page) ‘o’, ‘oh’ (an 
exclamation?). By reading it aloud we can reach an approximation of ‘one day’s water’ — 
resonating with the historical suggestion that water on the ship was low (is this a shipboard 
conversation we are overhearing?). On the following page we have ‘ant’, and a phrase that 
occurs later is the ‘want of water’. Thus some sense of pattern begins to emerge: this is a 
negation of one regime of sense, but it is not nonsense. 
Yet it is also not voice. The poem remains irreducibly ambiguous, and as it unfolds its 
resistance to interpretation becomes more stubborn, the ‘logic’ of its rhythms and patternings 
more difficult to parse. The poem inhabits the threshold between sense and nonsense, and this 
threshold maps onto its larger project: the challenge Zong! undertakes is to release the ghosts 
of the archive from silence and representation, from de-animation and re-personalisation. 
What we witness or hear is the possessive power of language in ruins. 
In the ‘Notanda’ Philip speculates about water as a sound-efficient medium; she wonders 
whether the sound of the slaves, their ‘wails, cries, moans, and shouts’, resounded under the 
sea (203). These sounds resurface in Zong!, in its language of ‘grunt and groan, of moan and 
stutter’ (206). This resounding might be lyrical but only in the most primordial sense, 
implying a lyric not of language but of an ecstatic song, heard ‘at the beginning of time’: 
‘Zong! is chant! Shout! And ululation! Zong is moan! Mutter! Howl! And shriek! […] Zong! 
is Song!’ In this light, it is clear that Philip’s project firmly rejects not just the discourse of 
legal slavery but also the protocols of historical fiction, which generally aim to recover the 
voices of history and reincorporate them into the present imaginary.63 Philip’s phonic 
counter-animism is more about a kind of disincorporation: the process by which the thing is 




In her impressionistic essay ‘Wor(l)ds Interrupted’ Philip asks whether Zong! is ‘a ritual work 
masquerading as a conceptual work’, where ritual is ‘perhaps the way through the 
unsayable’.64 In the same essay and elsewhere, Philip has parsed this ‘ritual’ element in 
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relation to Spiritual Baptism. Indeed, Philip has stated (or joked) that she ‘outs herself’ as a 
‘closet Spiritual Baptist’ each time she performs the poem.65 This dimension of the poem has 
been almost entirely overlooked in the rapidly growing body of criticism on Zong!. A small 
handful of critics have recognised that Zong! is a performance poem as much as a text for 
private reading, and noted some of the ways in which this performance is ritualised, but none 
have observed how this ritualisation borrows elements from Spiritual Baptism.66 
Spiritual Baptism is a syncretic religious practice: it subscribes to a Christian theology but 
incorporates Africanist practices of spirit possession.67 It is an originally Caribbean religion, 
most associated with Trinidad and St. Vincent, but is also practiced in Caribbean diasporic 
communities around the world. Its status as ‘religion’ though has historically been vexed. 
Spiritual Baptism (‘Shakerism’ or ‘Shouter Baptism’ as it was formerly known) was 
outlawed in St Vincent in 1912 and Trinidad and Tobago in 1917, the culmination of decades 
of persecution against practitioners (in St Vincent, Spiritual Baptists call themselves the 
‘Converted’).68 A report on Vincentian ‘Shakers’ in Trinidad from the 1890s captures the 
colonial attitude: 
An abominable nuisance has been created in town by the arrival from St Vincent, it is 
believed, of a pack of fools described as “Shakers”. They hold what they call religious 
meetings and perform all manner of weird incantations accompanied by hideous 
yelling and riotousness which cannot but convince one that they are a band of lunatics 
calling for immediate confinement. They jump and skip and walk on their hands and 
go through a series of wild antics in the back streets – like so many brutes “possessed 
by the devil” – to propitiate “the spirit”.69 
The ordinances which followed, interestingly, were connected to the prohibition of Obeah: 
both were seen to challenge the legitimate mechanisms of colonial authority, such as 
institutionalised Christianity, and both were connected to subversive forms of apparently 
‘African’ bodily and ritual practice.70 These ordinances were adapted from older anti-
vagrancy laws, as if they targeted these practices of the dispossessed because of the proof 
they gave of an alternative distribution of possession, power and animation.  
While Spiritual Baptism is uncontroversially linked to African rituals of spirit possession, it is 
important to recognise the colonial nature of the religion: it is not merely syncretic in the 
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sense that a residual animism is interfused with a new world Christian theology, but in the 
historical and political sense that it is born out of the colonial situation. Thus the historical 
experiences of enslavement, the Middle Passage, and other colonial migrations are 
intermingled with scripture. The title of Wallace Zane’s book on Spiritual Baptism, Journeys 
to the Spiritual Lands, refers to the central experience of ‘journeying’ within the religion, 
where the pilgrim (a kind of shaman) travels in and via the Holy Spirit not only to Biblical 
lands but also to the sources of colonial labour: Africa, India, China — and even (quite often) 
the bottom of the sea.71 
This ritual of spiritual subversion is called ‘mourning’. There are many important rituals, but 
Zane describes mourning as the definitive one. ‘Pilgrims’ are enclosed within a mourning 
room in which they undertake their journey, which might last for a day or weeks, and which 
involves fasting, prayer, and spirit possession. The ‘shouting’ is the name for the report of 
this experience of spiritual journeying: it might begin, ‘I found myself in Africa’, as the 
pilgrim gradually translates their ecstatic experience into the language of the temporal world. 
Zane distinguishes between ‘churchly’ and ‘shamanic’ aspects of the religion, where churchly 
rituals enable the interpretation of the temporal world and where the ‘shamanic’ enact a 
‘ritual subversion’ of it.72 The shout rearticulates the ecstatic experience in social and 
communal terms: while the shout may begin within the state of possession, manifested in 
excessive bodily effects (such as shaking), the aim of this ritual is to achieve control over this 
condition, in order to transfer it into the work of what is called (in St. Vincent) ‘doption’. The 
idea is to give some order to spirit possession, in order to put it to work.73 
The shout therefore mediates between the churchly and the shamanic, the worldly and the 
otherworldly orientations of Spiritual Baptism. But the distinction between these realms and 
vocations seems to be productively unstable. If shouting translates ecstatic experience into a 
legible communal language, it is equally true that this work of translation is restlessly 
undone. Mourning is an ongoing and unending labour for the Converted, because what is 
being mourned is the condition of temporal life itself (‘your sins’).74 Shouting in this sense is 
as much a call to mourning as the dissemination of an experience. 
The priority of forms of ritual subversion, or even ritual ‘amelioration’, must be connected to 
the experience of colonial dispossession and ongoing poverty and marginalisation. Zane 
explains: 
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The order of the secular world, with policeman and soldiers and teachers and captains 
and doctors and nurses—all people who must be obeyed—is inverted. The Spiritual 
Baptists become by name and title police inspectors, corporally punishing teachers, 
captains of ships—all positions unavailable to them in the “natural” world. The 
horrors of slavery, the horror of the memory of slavery, the difficulties of colonial 
oppression, are effaced symbolically in Converted religion by the seizure of control of 
those very same oppressive structures.75 
The Converted are far from unique in this light: Zane mentions the famous ‘Cargo Cults’ of 
Melanesia, and Taussig and Stoller’s work on the Hauka resonates here as well. Zane later 
references Jean Comaroff’s work on the Tshidi Zionists in South Africa, whose ‘structural 
predicament condemns them to reproduce the material and symbolic forms of the neocolonial 
system’ but who nevertheless ‘address and redress experiential conflict’. Spiritual Baptism, 
similarly, gives ‘access to a spiritual world where the dominant position[s] … are now 
occupied by the Converted themselves’.76 But this raises the broader question of my 
argument: do the states of ecstasy or ritual dispossession that are produced by the shamanistic 
elements of Spiritual Baptism (the classic work on shamanism by Mircea Eliade is subtitled 
Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy) really subvert the worldly order, or do they produce a 
reorganised economy of symbolic power in which the fundamental structure of the social 
order is unaltered, even within the realm of spirit? This question perhaps reflects an inherent 
ambivalence, but it directly pertains to the performative work of Zong!. 
Zong! has been performed at arts festivals and academic conferences, in museums, public 
parks, and community centres. I witnessed a performance in summer 2014 in Trinity 
Bellwoods park in Toronto. Philip read from the poem, but this reading felt like an authentic 
transfiguration, or activation, of the text. The phonic materiality of the poem’s language 
emerged unmistakably. Daniel Benjamin offers an excellent description of Philip’s 
enunciation of the word ‘water’ in a performance in the US, of how ‘her lips slowly tremble 
the letter “w”’, such that we hear ‘the vibrating vocal cords along with the trembling lips’.77 
This is the phonic as disturbance, even as the disturbance of ‘New World configurations of 
value’, to quote from Lindon Barrett’s work, which Philip herself quotes at the opening of her 
book of essays, BlanK.78 The performance was also distinctly ritualised. There were torches 
to mark the performance area (creating a sacred or ‘set apart’ space); Philip, and other 
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helpers, wore the distinctive white robes associated with Spiritual Baptists; the performance 
involved expressive movement; it was also participatory, as extracts of the poem were shared 
and we were invited to speak, recite, or move as well. Thus there was a strongly 
improvisatory element, which included Philip’s extemporised adaptations of the text. 
This performance might be interpreted as a kind of shout, or as a combination of the rituals of 
mourning and shouting, as if the experience of journeying itself, traditionally a private 
(though facilitated) experience, has become a shared one. The words and sounds of this 
performance are as much a vehicle of the journey as they are a communication of it: they 
enact and immediate, animistically, the work and experience of mourning. If there is a 
distinction to be made between the churchly and shamanic in Spiritual Baptism, the two 
elements in Zong! have been decisively fused. This performance is less about making sense 
of the text (as in the churchly) than it is about making power out of it. But this is a 
paradoxical kind of power. This ritual performance opens not onto a rearrangement of the 
hierarchy of persons and souls, but onto a power of potential dispossession that extends at 
least across the space and duration of performance. 
In Spiritual Baptism, shaking, screaming, and shouting are supposed to be controlled, as the 
shamanic is subordinated to the churchly, so that these energies can be directed into the 
production of a particular kind of knowledge, a particular kind of resistant social formation. 
With Zong! this movement from the shamanic to the churchly is uncertain. Thus Zong!, 
interpreted through its performance, appears as a specific adaptation of Spiritual Baptist 
ritual. This ritual is inherently related to the experience of colonial dispossession and 
enslavement: where else does Zong! take us other than to the bottom of the sea? What is 
being conjured is the very subversive and decolonial spirit of spirit possession. Like Spiritual 
Baptist mourning, and other anticolonial rituals, the poem enacts a resistance to the condition 
of degraded life. But this resistance to degradation itself initiates a certain degradation, 
because it breaks down the hierarchical order of animation and personhood that undergirds 
the construct of Man — even to the extent of magically dissolving the border between the 
living and the dead. If the poem’s deracinated words and sounds are a witness to what 
Orlando Patterson calls the ‘natal alienation’ of the enslaved, they are also a subversive 
gesture insofar as they unwork this colonial systematisation of life. 
The poem offers no compensation for the history of enslavement and coloniality; it reserves 
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no capacity to retrieve and restore degraded life. Instead, the poem’s degraded form, 
encountered most powerfully in the sound of its performance, enacts a certain sympathy with, 
a mimetic relation to, this condition of degradation. Zong!’s is not a human or socially legible 
language; it is the language of the body excluded from the biopolitical order, of the body that 
is, animistically, unreadable. Philip herself uses an instructive term, derived from the sales 
book of a slave agent: the meagre.79 Zong!’s ecstatic and also formless or deformed language 
expresses and even affirms the condition of meagreness. 
Zong! therefore cannot reverse the transubstantiation by which the human became chattel; it 
cannot reanimate the ghosts or exhume the bodies. But it does enact a different and non-
dominative form of magic. The poem indeterminates the relationship between possession and 
dispossession, animation and de-animation. It exposes the dark magic of chattelisation and in 
turn ‘auto-destructs’, or at least exits, the biopolitical machine of animism. As Philip utters 
her sounds — from the bottom of the sea, from the beginning of time — she is inviting us to 
commune with a life that circulates outside of the hierarchies of colonial animism, to enter 
into the vicinity of a depersonalised form of animation. In this sense, I have been arguing, the 
poem constitutes a ritual disclosure of the process by which animism escapes animism as a 
distributive system, in order to conjure something outside of the colonial order of being: an 
animacy rather than a life, a sound rather than a voice, presences rather than a person. 
If animism, as Harry Garuba asserts, is the ‘included exclusion’ of colonial modernity, then it 
is problematic to assume that it can provide the tools to transcend coloniality’s violence.80 
My aim has been to locate animism within the scene of colonial violence, and to keep it there. 
Rather than extracting animism as an emancipatory alter-cosmology, I have aimed to follow 
the process by which it might unfold a logic of autodestruction or autodegradation that 
undermines its own distributive project. If it is possible to degrade the opposition between 
biopolitical rationality and animistic possession by observing their shared investments in the 
distribution of animacy, as in a hierarchical structure of personhood that maps different 
intensities of aliveness, then this animistic autodegradation – what I have parsed as its 
dispossession of itself – is also, as we see in Zong!, the process by which the assumptions of 
biopolitical animism can be radically disturbed. For animism to resist biopolitics, in other 
words, it has to become something other than animism: it has to sabotage the machine that 
would administer the distribution of the animate, in all of the ways I have described. 
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If it is clear that Philip’s poem undertakes disruptive work, refusing the reclamation of voice 
or the rearticulation of personhood, it also needs to be recognised that something becomes 
possible in the disruption of these projects of representation and reclamation: the system by 
which people possess themselves and are possessed needs to be rendered dispossessive before 
these more obviously affirmative projects can begin to make sense. While Zong! lives ‘in the 
wake’, what resonates within it is also a longer history of rituals of anticolonial subversion, 
with their insurrectionary powers. This context is important. In extemporised adaptations of 
the text in performance, Philip will sometimes include names of contemporary victims of 
police brutality in the US and Canada, bringing the poem’s long view of racist brutality into 
focus and intersecting with the emergent politics of Black Lives Matter. In a way that seems 
akin to Claudia Rankine’s list of names in Citizen, which are invoked and disappeared by the 
poem as the print on the page fades out, these names are summoned but not restored.81 But 
these references underscore how the poem positions itself in and as a site of struggle: to put it 
in the terms from Zane above, its work is shamanic and churchly. But with the endless 
adaptability of systems of racist domination and the ever intensifying investments in 
partitioning and hierarchising the domain of the living, it is clear that this combat cannot be 
won on this stage alone, as the poem mourns at once for the necessity and insufficiency of its 
own churchly-shamanic, worldly and animistic power. 
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